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has given us certain commands supernaturally while denying that we are morally bound 
to carry them out. This surely cannot be a position Kant intends us to embrace. Kant's 
only purpose in mentioning pure rationalism at all seems to be the rhetorical one of 
cushioning his evident denial of pure supernaturalism." 
6. The Conflict of the Faculties 19110, henceforth cited as CF. See also Critique of Pure 
Reason A 748-501B776-8. 
7. E.g. "What is Orientation in Thinking?" 3011142. Kant goes on to recommend pure 
rational belief for practical as well as theoretical reason. 
8. E.g. R 94, and the preface to the second edition. 
9. CF 77/44, emphasis added. 
10. "(Historical belief is) its mere sensible vehicle (for certain people and certain eras), 
it is not an essential part of religious faith" (CF 63/37). R 1021111 and other passages like 
it can be read as making the point that historical faith can have its special power only as 
the vehicle of pure religious faith. 
11. CF 75/43. 
12. See R. B. Braithwaite, "An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief," 
in The Existence of God, edited by John Hick (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 246. See 
also R. M. Hare, "The Simple Believer" in Religion and Morality, edited by Gene Outka 
and John P. Reeder, Jr. (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 406ff. 
13. R 135n/126n. At the time when thc very form of the church is dissolved, this so to 
speak contingent necessity might cease, see R 126, and 112. Kant makes a similar point 
in The End of All Things, 338/82. Until that point, Christ "brings to the hearts of his fellow 
men their own well-understood wills." 
14. CF 115/63. 
15. The End of All Things, 338/82. 
16. Metaphysics of Morals: The Doctrine of Virtue, 162/486. 
17. See R 971105. 
The Evidential Force of Religious Experience, by Carolyn Franks Davis. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Pp. ix and 268. Cloth, $55.00. 
DOUGLAS CHISMAR, Ashland University. 
The recurrent interest in the epistemic value of religious experience has 
created a need for someone to patiently and systematically sort out the many 
different issues, questions, and kinds of data which might be brought to bear 
on the topic. Carolyn Franks Davis has done just this in The Evidential Force 
of Religious Experience. The work is a presentation of her graduate research 
done at Oxford under Basil Mitchell and, later, Richard Swinburne. It is an 
excellent piece of philosophical analysis, combining careful conceptual re-
flection with a review of relevant material from the fields of cognitive and 
social psychology. 
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Franks Davis is clearly committed to the value of religious experience as 
a form of evidence for the truth of theism. "For all the mishandling they have 
received, religious experiences are an essential and highly valuable source of 
evidence for many religious claims" (p. 250). Much of the book is devoted 
to responding to the various attacks upon the epistemic value of religious 
experience by Flew, Mackie, Freud, et al. The process of developing re-
sponses leads Franks Davis to a cautious statement of the properly limited 
epistemic role of appeals to religious experience. Rather than developing an 
argument from religious experience, she follows Swinburne and Mitchell by 
incorporating the appeal to experience into a larger "cumulative case." 
Franks Davis begins with religious language issues, arguing for a form of 
"critical realism" regarding the models of metaphors employed in religious 
language. Maintaining that "irreducibly metaphorical utterances can them-
selves state truths about the world" (p. 10), she rejects the view that religious 
experience is necessarily ineffable (a belief which might have made this a 
very short book). Turning to the sticky question of defining religious expe-
rience, she prefers to cast her net widely by defining six aspects or categories 
of religious experience: the interpretive (paranormal events), quasi-sensory, 
revelatory, regenerative, numinous, and mystical. She makes use of these 
categories quite often in the book, recognizing that mystical or ecstatic ex-
periences must be handled differently than the phenomena of everyday relig-
ious life. 
An important focus of the book is upon the role that interpretation plays 
in religious experience. The author argues for an "incorporated interpreta-
tion" view which recognizes "interpretation we perform unconsciously to 
transform the stimuli with which we are constantly bombarded into intelligi-
ble experiences of recognizable concepts" (p. 27). Franks Davis cites the 
work of cognitive psychologists such as Jerome Bruner, Leon Festinger, and 
Schachter and Singer to show, in response to the "vicious circle" challenge 
("the claim that because religious experiences involve interpretation in terms 
of religious doctrines, any argument attempting to justify those doctrines by 
an appeal to religious experiences must be viciously circular," p. 142), that 
interpretation occurs in all perception and thus does not uniquely vitiate the 
epistemic value of religious experience. '''Unconscious interpretation' would 
only be good grounds for a challenge if it could be shown (i) that the set 
which influenced the experience incorporated incorrect rules of inference or 
(ii) that the set was of a type which generally leads to misperceptions" (p. 
154). Neither appears to be uniformly the case. 
The author can thus agree with views such as that of Stephen Katz that all 
religious experience inherently involves interpretation: it is impossible to 
separate interpretation from "the given." Like Katz, she cites this interpretive 
activity as a reason to reject a "perennial philosophy" as well as other shaky 
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syntheses of the various kinds of experiences. Yet, surprisingly she ends up, 
with Zaehner, Smart, and Underhill, arguing for a "common core," a "broad 
theism" which she finds to be present even in such unexpected places as the 
Buddhist tradition. Her arguments at this point seemed quite shaky and specu-
lative, often involving a second-guessing of traditional interpretations. A 
valuable principle does come forth from this exercise, viz., the tenet that the 
evidential force of religious experience varies inversely with the specificity 
of the claims it is called upon to support. The "finer points" of working 
historical religions must turn elsewhere for support (p. 191). 
The real action in the book comes when the author moves to discuss the 
various challenges to the epistemic value of religious experience. She notes 
that religious experience arguments have tended to suffer from three kinds 
of defects: (i) they move too quickly to the Judeo-Christian concept of God, 
(ii) not enough attention is given to empirical research and alleged counter-
explanations, and (iii) they frequently attempt to base a highly ramified sys-
tem of beliefs upon fairly narrow lines of argument. Franks Davis is 
especially strong in responding to the second defect. She divides the typical 
challenges into three categories: description-related (where the subject has 
shown poor ability to remember or articulate his experiences), subject-related 
(where the subject has been shown to be in a "set" or situation likely to lead 
to unveridical experiences), and object-related (where background evidence 
causes us to regard it as improbable that the object of the experience has been 
veridically perceived). 
In a well-documented chapter, "The Reductionist Challenge," the author 
sorts through research from cognitive psychology and attribution theory in 
order to respond to a whole series of alleged counter-explanations of religious 
experience, such as hypersuggestibility, deprivation, sexual frustration, 
drugs, dreams and hallucinations, the operation of defense mechanisms, re-
gression, cognitive need, maladjustment (and, in general, mental illness), and 
natural histories of religion. I found especially lucid her comments about the 
difficulties involved in isolating "religious" individuals or behavior for study, 
a problem which appears to cause some damaging biases in experimental 
design. Readers who have followed philosophical debate about religious ex-
perience while not keeping up with the empirical studies of religious behavior 
will find this section especially rewarding. 
There are two positive aspects of Franks Davis' discussion which I would 
have preferred that she carry further. First, she repeatedly warns that a relig-
ious experience argument can do little on its own. Since religious experience 
is linked with "a complex pattern of cognitive, perceptual, and personal 
factors ... any argument which does it justice must take that complexity into 
account" (p. 4). Following Swinburne and Mitchell, the author proposes a 
"cumulative case" approach to arguing for theism. In a complex interplay, 
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the appeal to religious experience is made more plausible (or "probable," 
following Swinburne) by traditional arguments for the existence of God, but 
is rendered less plausible by such lingering difficulties as the problem of evil 
or the atrocities committed by religious people. It seems to me to be quite 
realistic that one's view of the status of religious experience should be influ-
enced in this way by broader philosophical issues surrounding theism. One 
wishes here, as in Mitchell's writings, for a closer definition of a successful 
"cumulative case." The complexity which gives rise to the notion of a cumu-
lative case seems also to leave it an elusive concept, definable only by equally 
hazy illustrations. 
Secondly, Franks Davis offers a novel application of the "cumulative case" 
concept by acknowledging that non-theists may also seek to build "cumula-
tive challenges" against religious experience. Unresolved philosophical dif-
ficulties with theism in general may render probable naturalistic 
interpretations of religious experience where such interpretations would not 
normally, in themselves, be conclusive. Since Franks Davis believes that 
Swinburne et al. have done a satisfactory job of responding to these back-
ground objections to theism, she concludes that there is no reason to prefer 
these dubitable naturalistic counter-explanations. In fact, in line with Swin-
burne's "principle of credulity," religious interpretations should be preferred 
until naturalistic explanations can be found for all alleged religious experi-
ences, something Franks Davis believes cannot be achieved. 
In arriving at this conclusion, however, I believe the author glosses over 
another important form of the cumulative challenge. This is what I would call 
the "cumulative counter-explanation" challenge, which holds that given any 
religious experience Z, and a record of successes in reducing individual 
religious experiences in the past, it is probable that Z can be naturalistically 
defeated by either challenge A or B or C, etc. To her credit, Franks Davis 
seeks to avoid the simplistic (and all too common) reply to reductionist 
challenges that since no one counter-explanation fits all the cases of religious 
experience, some such experiences must have evidential force. Yet she never 
really acknowledges the cumulative effect that successful reductions may 
have upon the skeptic's attitude toward the remaining experiences. 
On two separate occasions the author attempts a brief but unsatisfying 
response to this challenge. First, she argues that the sheer number of alterna-
tive available pathological explanations does not increase the probability that 
all cases of religious experience can be counter-explained: 
Although none of the four types of 'pathological' reductionist challenge has 
wide application to religious experience, it might be objected that if they 
were combined, most religious experiences would be defeated by at least one 
of them, and so the argument from religious experience would fail. The 
combined challenge is unlikely to have so much force, however. Pathological 
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personality variables tend to be present in clusters (people are often anxious, 
insecure, and hypersuggestible, for instance), and many subjects of religious 
experience escape all of them; and it is clear that the other types of patho-
logical factors (e.g., hallucinogens), whose presence is much easier to detect, 
are absent from the vast majority of cases of religious experience (p. 223). 
In other words, the clustering effect limits the evidential force of there being 
many pathological forms of reduction. Nor, second, does she believe the 
non-pathological forms of counter-explanation have a cumulative force: 
Atheists such as J. L. Mackie admit that no natural history of religious 
experience so far developed can adequately account for the phenomenon of 
religious experience as a whole. He is confident, however, that in combina-
tion they could provide 'an adequate and much more economical naturalistic 
alternative' to religious explanations, so that even psychologically sound 
religious experiences do not escape the reductionist net. But Mackie offers 
no such account himself. Presumably the combined theory would have to be 
extremely complex ... However, it would still be difficult to show that this 
was a complete account. In fact, most theists would agree with Mackie that 
each natural history discussed above 'correctly identifies factors which have 
contributed to some extent to religion', but that is far from admitting that 
together they constitute a highly probable and complete reductionist account 
of religion (p. 230). 
Mackie, it is alleged, goes beyond the evidence represented by past reduc-
tionist successes in claiming that all religious experiences are vulnerable to 
reduction. 
This response seems too quick and optimistic, however. Unless one places 
a tremendous weight upon the principle of credulity, to claim that religious 
experience has "evidential force" for others as well as the experiencer is, in 
my view, to incur an obligation to at least show that there is not a "trend" of 
successful counter-explanation. Otherwise, such a trend would make it prob-
able that the remaining experiences can be reduced just like the others have 
been. That is, successful religious counter-explanations may have a cumula-
tive effect, at least in terms of affecting the plausibility of believing that some 
religious experiences will survive reduction. Franks Davis is to be praised 
for drawing attention to the complexity of these appraisals; perhaps her book 
will serve as a stepping stone to a full response to the cumulative counter-
explanation challenge. 
Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith, by M. 
Jamie Ferreira. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Pp. 168. $39.95 (cloth). 
CAROLINE J. SIMON, Hope College. 
Professor M. Jamie Ferreira's Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in 
Kierkegaardian Faith brings an impressive array of resources to bear on the 
